Maduro’s Ousture and Trial: Was Trump Right?

The predawn raid that extracted Nicolás Maduro from Caracas marks one of the most powerful assertions of American power in Latin America since the Cold War. While the operation raises serious questions about international law and sovereignty, there are compelling reasons to view it as a justified, if controversial, response to an intolerable situation that had festered for over a decade.

The strongest argument in favor of Trump’s decision rests on the simple fact that Maduro’s regime had become utterly illegitimate by any reasonable standard. This wasn’t merely a matter of poor governance or ideological disagreement. As Professor Aryeh Katzovich of Hebrew University writes for Channel 12, Maduro presided over a comprehensive collapse of Venezuelan society; transforming what was once South America’s wealthiest nation into a failed state that has hemorrhaged over 8 million citizens, roughly a quarter of its population. The regime’s involvement in international drug trafficking, documented ties to cartels, and alleged crimes against humanity placed it beyond the pale of normal diplomatic engagement.

The July 2024 election fraud, following similar manipulation in 2018, demonstrated that no internal democratic solution was possible. When a dictator falsifies elections, imprisons opposition leaders, and controls all branches of government through force, the usual tools of international pressure reach their limits. Katzovich notes that over 50 countries have not recognized the legitimacy of his regime for many years, underscoring how isolated Maduro had become internationally.

From a purely strategic perspective, the operation also served important American interests. Venezuela’s vast oil reserves had become leveraged by hostile powers; China, Russia, and Iran, as part of what Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), calls “the axis of authoritarians.” The Trump Corollary outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy drew a clear line about non-hemispheric competitors in the Western Hemisphere. As Berg observes, the fact that President Trump launched this operation hours after Nicolás Maduro met with China’s special envoy sends a clear and unequivocal message to China about Beijing’s role in the Americas.

Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, who became installed by Venezuela’s Supreme Court as President after Maduro’s capture, went so far as to accuse Israel of involvement in the US military action. Speaking during a Saturday address in which she convened a National Defense Council, Rodriguez claimed the attack has “Zionist undertones,” she said. “It’s truly shameful.”

Her baseless claims have raised concerns among members of Venezuela’s small Jewish community, both domestically and overseas. During heightened tensions between Caracas and Washington in November, Maduro had also accused Zionists of attempting to deliver Venezuela to “devils.” At a November 15 Bolivarian Integral Base Committee event, Maduro said, “There are those who want to hand this country over to the devils – you know who, right? The far-right Zionists want to hand this country over to the devils.”

Venezuela cut ties with Israel in 2009 under President Hugo Chavez, and has aligned itself with Israeli – and US – enemies, including Iran.

The tactical brilliance of the operation itself should not be overlooked. Berg describes how the U.S. Air Force controlled the skies, Venezuela’s radars and electrical grid were jammed, and many of its air defenses were destroyed. Unlike the chaotic invasions of Iraq or Afghanistan, this was a surgical strike targeting a specific criminal leader under U.S. indictment. The precision minimized casualties and, as Katzovich hopes, created space for Venezuelans themselves to chart their country’s future course, benefiting from an organized opposition and an alert and proactive civil society.

Yet even acknowledging these points, the intervention demands serious scrutiny on multiple fronts. The most fundamental objection concerns the precedent it establishes for international relations. Justin Logan, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, warns that one could easily imagine a Chinese indictment of a Taiwanese leader, under specious grounds, as lubricating a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The rule of law means little if major powers can simply declare their adversaries criminals and act accordingly.

The European Union’s measured response captured this tension well. Katzovich notes their position: the Maduro regime was no longer legitimate and had to be replaced, but the transition to a new and legitimate regime must be done peacefully, and with the decision of the Venezuelan people. This isn’t mere legalistic nitpicking; it reflects a hard-won understanding that regime change imposed from outside, however justified it may seem in the moment, frequently produces outcomes far worse than the original problem.

The risk of mission creep looms large. Trump’s statement that the United States would be “running” Venezuela, even temporarily, evokes the darkest chapters of American interventionism in Latin America. Berg noted a troubling detail: just as noteworthy was the dearth of mentions of Venezuelan opposition in Trump’s press conference. This raises serious questions about who actually governs Venezuela now and what role democratic forces will play.

Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center, poses a critical question: if the worst does happen, what then will be the message received in Beijing or Moscow? Will it demonstrate American strength or simply remind adversaries that American presidents can act against their own long-term interests? She suggests the “Trump Corollary” may end up as little more than a synonym for overconfident failure if things go wrong.

The regional implications also cut both ways. Daniel DePetris, a fellow at Defense Priorities, observes that even small powers don’t like to be dictated to, and if the pressure gets too intense, they may choose to enact strategies of hedging or balancing to defend their own security interests. He notes the irony that it would be the height of irony if Trump’s military operation in Venezuela winds up complicating his own grand strategy by potentially pushing other Latin American nations closer to China; exactly the opposite of what the Trump Corollary aims to achieve.

Stephen Kinzer, a senior fellow at the Watson School for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, offers a particularly sharp critique of the underlying motivations. He suggests that Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s real goal is to destroy Cuba’s lifeline, hoping that without Venezuelan oil, Cuba’s political system will finally collapse. Kinzer warns this could turn both countries into submissive clients – or into bloody battlegrounds where a new generation of Latin Americans will seek to defy what the Nicaraguan rebel leader Augusto César Sandino called “the eagle with larcenous claws.”

The operation’s ultimate success cannot be judged by its tactical brilliance alone. Berg aptly frames the moment: This is, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning. The harder question is whether Venezuela will emerge from this moment with legitimate, stable governance—or whether it will descend into chaos.

Katzovich draws a cautionary comparison to the 2003 Iraq invasion: it is hoped that with the relatively “surgical” activity of the United States, in contrast to the invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003 and led to chaos and civil war in the country, the scenario in Venezuela will be more positive and with a better ending. But he acknowledges that the future is shrouded in mist.

The country does have advantages. As Katzovich notes, Venezuela benefits from an organized opposition and an alert and proactive civil society, which will know how to direct a correct path to decide its fate.

But prolonged American control remains deeply problematic. Daniel Drezner, academic dean and distinguished professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, warns that the Trump administration will use this Maduro action to threaten the leaders of recalcitrant allies and weak adversaries that they might be next on the chopping block, which could either cow them into compliance or drive them toward other great powers for protection.

Bob McNally, founder and president of Rapidan Energy Group, offers a sobering assessment of Venezuela’s economic potential: while the country could eventually play a much bigger role in global oil markets given its enormous reserves, it is essential to recognize that achieving long-term potential will be a long and winding road, with numerous political, commercial and market risks.